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INTEGRATED FOUCAULT: ANOTHER LOOK AT DISCOURSE AND POWER

ABSTRACT
This paper argues that there is continuity in Foucault’s thought, as opposed to the common division of his work into three phases, each marking a distinct field of research – discourse, power, subject. The idea is that there are no radical turns in his work that justify this division; rather, there is a shift of focus: all crucial concepts are present (more or less [in]explicitly) in all periods of his thought and in all of his undoubtedly differently-toned and oriented works. This is shown through examining the characteristics of archaeology and genealogy, their relation, as well as the relation of discursive practices and strategies of power to knowledge. The retrospective and (re)interpretation intend to shed light on the constant interplay between concepts that demonstrate continuity in Foucault’s thought. The viewpoint, based in the integrity of Foucault’s work, offers a better starting point for understanding certain aspects of his theories.

Introduction
One can argue that one of the main features of Foucault’s work is constant self-reflection – on numerous occasions he analyses and re-analyses the subjects and methods of his work. The question remains, however, as to whether Foucault had significantly changed his mind over time, or just his focus, i.e. the perspective from which he approached the same subjects.

Foucault’s philosophy is commonly divided into three phases, each one dealing with a specific field of research: discourse, power, subject. However, rather than deeming this change in orientation a change in the research field, it seems more plausible to say that Foucault is shedding new light on certain aspects of his previous examinations. One can argue that these three phases are interwoven and their subject-matters present since the very beginning, although emphasized only later. Foucault himself, while talking about his works Madness and Civilization, The Order of Things, and Discipline and Punish in his final interview (Foucault 1990: 243) openly says that some matters have been left inexplicit, because of the way in which he posed problems, in which he approached matters. For example, Foucault clearly states the three main problems he tried to outline: the problem of truth, the problem of power, and the problem of individual behaviour (government of the

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self). He considers them three realms of experience that are properly viewed only in light of their mutual relations, not independently. Foucault thus believes that the shortcoming of the first two phases of his thought and the “shift” in his philosophy are due to the lack of a proper study of the government of the self; nevertheless, that does not stop him from studying truth or power.

With this in mind, can we speak of an unbreakable – or at least an inexplicit – continuity in Foucault’s thought, despite the “turns” and “phases” which scholars ascribe to him for analytic reasons? Is it necessary, and appropriate, to speak of the “early and late” Foucault, and thus be left without the segment of his thought one cannot find in discourse, power, or the subject alone, but only in their mutual relations?

The issue is not whether Foucault had changed, because he certainly did not constantly repeat himself. The issue is whether Foucault created a sort of ambivalence and confusion which led to the (far too) sharp division of his generally consistent work. In regard to this, it might be interesting to return to frequently examined subjects of discourse and power, only now through the lens of the idea of a connection between these key concepts, contrary to the conventional division of Foucault’s work. The reinterpretation is inspired by the fact that the connection, although Foucault had emphasized it, was either ignored or marginalized – we generally acknowledge it, but nevertheless wonder whether this was also said by the “early” or the “late” Foucault.

For that reason, the focus of this paper should move towards the shift from the first to the second phase of Foucault’s work, giving us a better understanding of some characteristics of both archaeology and genealogy (and their mutual relation), the methods most closely associated with these two “periods” of Foucault’s thought. The examination needs to invariably reflect on the specific relation between discursive practices and strategies of power towards knowledge, offering thus a (re)interpretation of Foucault’s idea regarding the unbreakable connection between power and knowledge. Firstly, one should be reminded of some of the recurring motives and features of Foucault’s work as a whole.

Problems I

“[W]hat I did was designed to bring into the open a series of problems.” (Foucault 1981: 103)

While reflecting on his work from the beginning to the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault divides his works into books of exploration and book of method, and remarks that while *The History of Madness* and *Birth of the Clinic* are books of exploration, *The Archaeology of Knowledge, Discipline and Punish*, and *The Will to Knowledge* (the first volume of the *The History of Sexuality*) are books of method (where the method as such is explicated). The problem is the fact that Foucault does not apply a general method in every work, but constructs a new method of analysis depending on the object of investigation. (Foucault 1981: 28) The prime characteristic of Foucault’s approach is that he likes to outline problems. At one point, Foucault even defined his entire work as the history of different problematics – of studying how and why something becomes a problem that needs to be addressed, in what
circumstances and what processes are involved. As he admits, his intention was to circumscribe certain types of problems through his work. (Foucault 1990: 251)

Foucault holds problematising to be a general objective: „I believe that problematising and constant re-problematising what needs to be done. If the effort of thinking has any purpose [...] then it is to radically problematise how we perceive our actions (our sexual activity, punitive practices, attitude toward madness, etc.).” (Foucault 1994a: 612) One should problematise what is believed to be self-evident, what is most self-evident: „It means allegiance to an idea that man is a being that contemplates even its most tacit actions. [...] The effort of thinking does not reveal evil that secretly resides in everything that is, but senses a danger that hides in everything common – what seemed certain becomes problematic.” (Foucault 1994a: 612) To question what seems certain, the least problematic, the most evident – that is what Foucault considers the task of thinking.

That being so, the aim of circumscribing certain types of problems is not their solution, but to grasp them in their entirety, to gather them together. That is why his books end by bringing out a certain type of problem. (Foucault 1990: 251) For example, at the end of Discipline and Punish there is no answer to the question of the intended and actual function of prison, but a call to explore the power of normalisation and the formation of knowledge in modern society. (Foucault 1995: 308)

The task of philosophy, according to Foucault, is not simply describing “contemporaneity” and “ourselves today”, but also attempting to understand how that which is, by grasping why and how it is, may no longer be what it is. (Foucault 1998c: 449–450) Foucault’s explicit aim is to transform our relationship with the world which so far seemed familiar to us – to change our relationship with knowledge, to be precise. (Foucault 1981: 37) “[T]his game of truth and fiction [...] will permit us to see clearly what links us to our modernity and at the same time will make it appear modified to us. This experience that permits us to single out certain mechanisms [...] and at the same time to separate ourselves from them by perceiving them in a totally different form, must be one and the same experience. This procedure is central to all my work.” (Foucault 1981: 37-38) But, of course, not only to Foucault’s work. He generally regards the work of the intellectual as a possibility to make that which is appear as that which might not be (or might not be as it is). (Foucault 1998c: 450) As coming to the realisation that something that seems necessary might actually not be so. If we were to attempt to write a history of what seemed necessary, we would discover a network of contingencies; and once we realise that it is something “made” and try to grasp the mechanisms behind it, we have the possibility of unmaking it. (Foucault 1998b: 450) For the way things are ordered does not entail that it is necessary for them to be like that – it is just a contingency. It is also contingent that we question the truth of some things and deem some matters problematic, but not others.

Foucault calls this approach thinking in term of the event. It entails a break with the obvious. Instead of referring to the obvious which is imposed on us, when tempted to refer to it we should try to bring out some “peculiarity”. “To show that it is not ‘so inevitable’; that it was not obvious that madmen should be deemed mentally ill; that it was not obvious that the only thing one ought do with the offender is to lock him up; that it is not obvious to look for causes of illness in the individual examination of the body, etc. To break with the obvious in which our knowledge,
our consent, our practices are grounded.” (Foucault 1994b: 23) Besides, thinking in term of the event reveals connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on, which establish what counts as self-evident, universal, and necessary today. (Foucault 1994b: 23)

**Practice**

Contrary to common interpretation, Foucault’s analyses are not aimed at theories or institutions, but practices, in an attempt to grasp the conditions that at a given moment make these practices acceptable. He focuses on practice regimes where what is said and what is done are linked together, on imposed rules and the justifications behind them. Practice regimes entail programming behaviour, prescribing what needs to be done and known. (Foucault 1994b: 22)

In other words, when Foucault examines certain practices, he attempts to grasp how forms of rationality inscribe themselves into practices, and their role within them. For example, the ritual of public torture is no more irrational that putting someone in a cell. It is irrational only in relation to a certain kind of justification that the carceral practice has found for itself. Punitive practices associated with the institution of prison find their justification in discourses that are perceived as true – gaining thereby the right and power to draw the line between true and false – in the dominant scientific discourses of the time: medicine, psychology, criminology. That way, rationality is inscribed into the carceral practice, and it becomes rational and obvious that imprisonment is the most appropriate punishment for all who violate the law. The establishment of prison as a means of punishment is a discontinuity in relation to previous practices; Foucault attempts to explain this change, to locate and expose the transformation of „knowledge“ that enabled this sudden shift. (Foucault 1994b: 22) He is interested in how that practice, and every other practice, is inscribed into the field of what is self-evident. For something to even become a practice (in the sense of something constantly conducted) it must have an excuse – a certain regime of rationality as a guarantee that we are doing exactly what we should do.

The idea is, therefore, to examine the play between the law which prescribes forms of conduct and the constitution of true discourses which serve as the foundation, excuse, and reason for existence, as well as the principle that transforms these forms of conduct. The problem is discovering how people govern (themselves and others) by constituting the truth, by organizing the field in which the practice of true and false can be determined and adequate. (Foucault 1994b: 27) Thus the issue is always the link between power, discourse, and knowledge.

**Archive**

“[W]hat is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else?” (Foucault 2002: 31)

Foucault is an archivist, someone who collects archives of something spoken, of a speech. He analyses accumulated discourses in their archival form. (Foucault 1998b: 289–290) To him, speech is not a means for expressing thoughts, with thoughts being the object of attention. On the contrary, he views speech (discourse) as a system that
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establishes statements as *events* with its own conditions and domains of appearance. (Foucault 2002: 145) Archive, in Foucault’s view, is firstly the law of what can be said.

Speech involve rules; not grammar rules that govern it (which takes us back to analysing speech as a means for expressing thoughts), but the rules of its appearance and existence. Archaeology, being a description of archives, describes *discursive events*. Contrary to language analysis which asks according to what rules has a statement been made, as well as according to what rules can new statements be made, these descriptions pose the question: „how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?“ (Foucault 2002: 30) Within archaeology, Foucault is interested in the set of rules that define (Foucault 1968: 859-860) in a given time and for a given society what can be said – what is established as a domain of discourse in a given period; which discourses are forgotten, which are remembered, which are censored; which are widely accepted, which are depreciated; what role do previous discourses play in modern society – what old-time discourses have we preserved or attempted to restore, and what kind of individuals and groups accept a certain type of discourse – the institutional nature of the relation between discourse and the people who say it or receive it, but also *how the struggle between different groups for taking over control of discourse is unfolding*. Thus one can see that in the very definition of his research field Foucault already implies that at least part of his analysis will deal with the issues of struggle and power.

Foucault is, therefore, interested in the *conditions for the possibility of the existence* of discourse. But not a discourse that could be spoken but is not – not conditions for a *possible* discourse, but only if a discourse exists or had existed. If the discourse had appeared, Foucault is interested in the conditions that enabled it. If there are things said, or put simply, if something is said, the immediate reason for them is not what is said in them, or the people who said it, but the system of discursivity and the possibilities, i.e. impossibilities it lays down. (Foucault 2002: 145)

Archaeology thus seeks to be the history of spoken speech. As such, it does not deal with what lies behind a discourse, but with speech itself. It is speech that links together, brings into relation, elements that are otherwise dispersed. Only when they merge does something become (e.g. madness) an object – only through speech as a practice do objects one speaks about appear. In Foucault’s view, discourses do not speak about objects, but are practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak of and determine the subject’s place within that speech. (Foucault 2002: 54) Foucault’s interest in a specific aspect of discourse is supposed to shed light on its relation towards both the subject and object: only speech forms the objects and determines the place from which the subjects can speak of these objects.

With this in view, we can safely say that the archaeological analysis calls us to challenge the entire subject-object problematic which implies their separation. If while attempting to understand discourse we presume the creative activity of the sovereign subject or the transcendency of the assumed objective thing – that is, *words or things* – then this constitutive problematic is at risk of being subjected to *subjectivist or objectivist* reduction. In any case, what is reduced is the specificity of the instance of discourse. (Kozomara 1998: 101) This analysis is an attempt to go beyond words and things and lay the foundations for grasping things said (what is said).

Having in mind that The Archaeology of Knowledge presents only methodological specifications of already conducted research, a brief outline of the first phase
of Foucault’s work may be as follows: *The History of Madness* deals with the emergence of a group of highly interwoven, complex objects. It was necessary to describe the formation of these objects so as to determine the specificity of the whole of the psychiatric discourse. On the other hand, the point of research of *The Birth of the Clinic* was not so much the formation of the object, but status, institutional siting, the situation, and the modes of insertion used by the discoursing subject. Finally, in *The Order of Things*, research is generally focused on networks of concepts and the rules of their formation. (Foucault 2002: 72) While writing *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault could not contribute with an analysis of function that a particular discourse must carry out in a field of non-discursive practices, although one can argue that to a certain extent the work *Discipline and Punish* (which supposedly belongs to the second phase of Foucault’s work) does exactly that. That analysis shows that neither the process of appropriating discourse, nor its role among non-discursive practices, are extrinsic to the laws of its formation, but are precisely its formative elements. (Foucault 2002: 75)

**Origin**

“History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being.” (Foucault 1998: 380)

Genealogy is opposed to the search for “origins”. This limitation, present in respect to archaeology as well,\(^1\) seems at odds with the common usage of the word “genealogy” (in the sense of a study of origins and roots). Foucault, however, views origin that should be the subject of genealogy differently; he defines genealogy as analysis of origin in the sense of emergence – not as search for meaning or essence. The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is surely not to discover “origins” or the roots of (our) identity, but the dissipation of identity; it does not reveal our unique homeland, but strives to make visible all discontinuities that cross us. (Foucault 1998a: 386–387) The emergence is always produced in a particular state of forces or power relations – an analysis of origin is supposed to discern the play of these forces. (Foucault 1998a: 377)

The idea of emergence becomes clearer if one explains the idea of effective history. Contrary to historical tradition, which views events as if they have continuity, effective history discerns what is unique in a particular event. An example of an event can be a discourse, or a change in how punishment is conducted. The event is thus a discontinuity in relation to previous punitive practices. Genealogy seeks to analyse the origin of this event viewed as emergence.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Cf. „Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs.“ (Foucault 2002: 28) The reason for this is an effort to distance ourselves from the idea that there is another discourse behind what is actually said, as if its meaning was previously conceived, prompting us to search for it; an effort not to analyse figuratively what is said (which is basically an effort not to assume a subject that would serve as an explanation) but to grasp how a particular statement and not some other occurred.

\(^2\) One should have in mind that an event should not be viewed as a decision, treaty, reign, or battle, but as the reversal of a relation of forces (as a shift, a domination that grows feeble, enabling the entry of a new one). (Foucault 1998a: 381)
One should stress that Foucault sees discontinuity as a sudden shift, rather than a completely isolated unit. It is not as if a bunch of discourses spontaneously emerged independently of one another. Discontinuity – discourse as an event – appears in virtue of changes which unfold somewhere else (whether at the foundation of a discourse or within some non-discursive practices with which a particular discourse is associated). Besides, if discontinuity does occur within punitive practices, i.e. if a new form of punishment occurs, that is caused by changes which need to be examined. Shifts, events, emergence are not something that happen by themselves. They are a change in reign, although not in the physical sense of replacing one state government with another (although this should not be excluded), but rather specific changes in the play of government (power) and knowledge which serves as the foundation of ourselves and our speech.

History in this view can be characterized as the “history of the present”. (Gutting 2005: 10) One can say that one of the features of traditional history (whether aim or consequence) is showing that the current circumstances are inevitable. Contrary to this, Foucault’s histories aim to show the contingencies of what history has given us. They aim to remove the “air of necessity” by showing that the past ordered things differently and that the processes leading to our current practices and institutions were in no way inevitable. (Gutting 2005: 10–11) The genealogical method represents the history of the present in the sense that it attempts to problematise the necessity of dominant categories and procedures. Foucault does not find a reliable viewpoint from which he could interpret everything prior to the present, but defines our present as the most problematic. The present is where we can free ourselves from ourselves, where we can question what we are. (Kozomara 2001: 104)

An example of the first “genealogically” oriented work by Foucault is Discipline and Punish, which primarily focuses on practices and institutions. However, it is disputable whether we can differentiate Foucault’s methods, and associate these particular methods strictly with particular books which belong to a particular period of analyses. What is rather the case is that all of his books are to a certain degree both archaeology and genealogy, the history of concepts, the history of the present, and the history of problematisations. The only difference between them is their focal point, which largely depends on the topics discussed. With this in view, one can argue that all Foucault’s histories are histories of the present, in the sense that the issues they deal with correspond to modern ideas and practices which Foucault for some reason considered to be especially dangerous.

(Dis)continuity

Foucault’s switch from archaeology to genealogy is marked by an analysis of the relation between discourse and power, and indicated in his inaugural lecture at College de France in 1970 (a year after he published The Archaeology of Knowledge). (Foucault 1981)

There Foucault defines his analysis or, to be precise, the methodology of his future research as having both a critical and genealogical aspect. The critical aspect attempts to grasp the reversal happening at the level of discourse. As Foucault tells us, these reversals occur due to forms of exclusion, of limitation, and of appropriation.
of discourse. He attempts to identify and grasp these forms, which control discourse. (Foucault 1981: 70–73)

On the other hand, the genealogical aspect is concerned with the emergence of discourses, showing how a series of discourses came to be formed. In this context, the emergence of discourse is seen as an event, as a discontinuity, produced by contingent circumstances. He attempts to describe where that event takes place, the domain of its contingent production, and the conditions for its appearance. What is new is that Foucault attempts to grasp the formation of discourse in its affirmative power, meaning the power to constitute domains of objects, in the sense that it can affirm or deny true or false propositions.3 (Foucault 1981: 71–73)

These two tasks cannot be separated. As Foucault stresses, it is not that there are forms of exclusion, of limitation, and of appropriation of discourse on the one hand, and the spontaneous emergence of discourse (which is only later put under control) on the other. The very emergence of discourse entails mechanisms of control. What separates the critical and genealogical enterprise is thus not so much a difference of object or domain, but rather of point of attack and perspective. (Foucault 1981: 71–73)

Power

“[I]t seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power.” (Foucault 1980: 119)

Apart from altering the meaning of genealogy and thus abandoning the search for origin, the great theorist of power Foucault seemingly paradoxically holds the view that “power” does not exist. In this aspect, Foucault is a nominalist, excluding the existence of universal categories that encompass our experience, leaving us only with particular entities which constitute and exhaust a specific category. That means that there is no “power” as such, but only individual instances of domination, control,

3 In his inaugural lecture, Foucault speaks of the will for truth. Simply put, the will for truth is desire to know the truth about certain matters, to divide statements about objects into true and false, to privilege some discourses – or to be precise, some subjects within discourses – assigning them the right to tell the truth. However, the will for truth entails a desire for more truth, for more knowledge. It is an uncontrollable will for ever-more knowledge. For example, the will for knowledge pressures and coerces various disciplines to look for a rational foundation in true discourse. The punitive system firstly sought its foundations in law, switching afterwards to medical and psychological discourse. The law has its authority only in virtue of its connection to true discourse – discourse which at a given moment has power over the distinction between true and false. The will – the desire to seek the truth about matters – brings about a specific relation towards power or in Habermas’ words: power is ironically hidden within it. One can argue that all discourses have their origin in some kind of power. This is why Foucault switched from archaeology of knowledge to the genealogical analysis of the origin of discourse. While archaeology of knowledge reconstructs the rules that bring about some discourse, the role of genealogy is to shed light on the “discontinued” series of orders that impose upon man a particular interpretation of the world. Genealogy studies origins (in its specific sense) of discursive products which, formed as orders of discourses, represent power practices which are entwined with one another in the game of overpowering. Cf. Habermas 1990a, 1990b
edification, and similar. (Gutting 2005: 40) “Power” exhausts itself in relations – there are only concrete practices or strategies of power. Foucault does not imply a subject who has power which he may or may not exercise over others, but power relations which entwine those who exercise power, as well as those over whom power is exercised. He is interested in the very act of exercising power, how one acts upon the actions of others, or to be precise, how a group of subjects act upon the (present or future) actions of others. (Foucault 1983: 219-220) Power exists only in this act. For a system of power to function, it needs to be exercised over free people, the subjects of action. Accordingly, we can say that power does not entail violence over someone – it does not destroy, but produces actions (as well as practices, speech, knowledge, even identity) as reactions to power.

From this perspective, Foucault persistently attempts to demonstrate that there is nothing necessary about accepted categories and practices. All categories, truths, and knowledge which we deem obvious, owe their self-evidence to a system of power which is not something unchangeable. A history of necessities would unveil a web of contingencies which lie in its foundation. Genealogy is precisely the history of necessities; the web of contingencies is power-government. If one grasps how necessity or self-evidence is established – the strategies of power that guide it – one gains the power to disassemble it to its foundation. That way, we do not only lose self-evidence (the obvious, the necessary) but pave the way for different opinions and actions.

Truth

What is the relation between knowledge and power? How does power inscribe itself into knowledge, and vice versa? The answers to these questions must follow the trajectory of the previous analysis, for it is only in respect to knowledge that we can clarify the relation between discursive practices and strategies of power. Having in mind that Foucault defined knowledge in relation to archaeology as a group of statements formed by discursive practices, it is clear that strategies of power are inscribed into knowledge through discursive practices. Strategies of power, characteristic for a certain period, determine the object of speech, how to speak about it, who has the right to speak, and so on.

For example, in a summary of his lectures at College de France from 1973 and 1974, published under the name *Psychiatric Power* (Foucault 2006), Foucault remarks that the power the doctor exercises over the patient – visible in the right to separate him from his family and friends and consign him to an isolated place – is associated with what is true. The doctor (in this case the psychiatrist) is someone entitled to produce the truth about illness.

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4 This paper uses the term “power” because it is the common translation of the word *pouvoir*. However, since Foucault does not use it as a verb (meaning “to be able to”), but as a noun, the term “government” seems to be a more accurate translation. If one bears in mind that power actually means government, it becomes clear that Foucault speaks of it both in respect to those who govern and to those who are governed. Contrary to power which is seen as something per se, as something which someone has and can use, but does not have to, government entails power over someone, i.e. that someone or something is in the power of another. Foucault is interested in this relation, not in power as such.
The psychiatrist is in the position of someone who knows more of the madman than the madman himself, giving him the right to label the patient’s behaviour as illness – what is more, it is (the type of) illness of which the patient has no right over. Since science on which the doctor relies gives him the right to name what he sees as illness, this gives him the right to intervene. But (again with respect to knowledge) doctors consider him/her a very specific kind of patient – one that suffers from mental illness. And on that occasion, in that way, given the knowledge, competency and right of the doctor, hence in regard to specific power relations – psychiatry is established. It was this power game that established knowledge, which in turn laid the foundation for the rights of that power, which then paved the way for psychiatry. In these circumstances, the doctor turns out to be (or is established as) an official subject of knowledge, with knowledge “not [being] made for understanding ... [but] for cutting.” (Foucault 1998a: 380) The power carried by knowledge is the power to determine, assess, define, and classify another person. (Marinković 2005: 246–248)

Science is undoubtedly undergoing twists and turns, breaks with previously formulated true proposition, with how one speaks or sees, with a whole ensemble of practices, but Foucault holds that these are not new discoveries, but a new regime in discourse and knowledge. He remarks that certain moments and certain orders of knowledge undergo shifts and transformations which are at odds with the “continuist” image of science, that there is discontinuity regarding how some matters are perceived or approached. However, Foucault concludes that these changes are only a sign of other, deeper changes: changes in the rules of formation of statements accepted as scientifically true. It is thus not a change of content, nor theoretical form, but change at the level of what governs statements and the way they govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which can be verified, i.e. undergo some sort of scientific procedure. That is what Foucault deems the problem of regime, the politics of scientific statement. When analysing changes within science, he is interested in the modifications of the regime of the power of knowledge which lies in its foundation. This set of problems – the problem of status, conditions, exercise, functioning, the institutionalisation of (scientific) discourse – although not emphasized enough, seems crucial for the first phase of Foucault’s work. (Foucault 1980: 112–113)

Foucault therefore does not mean by truth an ensemble of verified propositions that need to be discovered and accepted, but a set of rules which draw the line between true and false, and according to which certain effects of power are associated with what is true. (Foucault 1980: 132) He is interested is finding how effects of truth are historically produced within discourses, which in themselves are neither true nor false. (Foucault 1980: 118) Truth as such is a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. These procedures, these regulations, are why there is something like a battle for truth, as Foucault calls it. (Foucault 1980: 132–133) History is just a continuation of struggles, strategies, and tactics. (Foucault 1980: 114) These strategies, however, are not mere repressive techniques that limit us; they produce and form knowledge – they produce discourse. They are a productive network that pervades the whole of the social body. This network governs us by virtue of production. In
the words of Foucault: “if it [power] never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it?” (Foucault 1980: 119)

Truth in this sense is not something external, nor without power. It is circularly associated with systems of power that produce and support it, as well as with the effects of power it produces and preserves and which renew it. Every society has its regime, its general politics of truth. This regime entails the acceptance and the functioning of certain discourses as true; it is a mechanism that enables true statements to differ from false. It is a political and institutional regime of the production of truth which statutorily gives official authority to those who are obliged to say what is true.

Problems II (instead of a conclusion)

If one were to single out one aspect of the relation between knowledge, power, truth, and discursive practices, perhaps it should be problematisation as such. As previously mentioned, in his later essays Foucault defines his previous work as a history of problematisations, i.e. of examining how and why something is determined as a problem that needs to be addressed, as well as the circumstances and processes involved. Having in mind that power inscribes itself into knowledge by means of discursive practices – which are systems of rules that determine what can become an object of knowledge – we can conclude that power is inscribed into knowledge through problematisation. Power exists where the question is posed.

If one is reminded that Foucault holds that problematisation is the purpose of thinking, it seems justified to argue that thinking as such opens the possibility for, if not overcoming an omnipresent system structured by means of discursive and practical techniques, then at least for evading its dominance. Only thinking, and not political practice, enables us to distance ourselves from the naturalised struggle for power, the endless circle of overcoming and resistance. The instance of thinking – problematising self-evident categories under which we and others fall – disables the total functioning of those systems and procedures of power within which we nevertheless reside.

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Integriseda Fuko: drugi pogled na diskurs i moć

Apstrakt

Nasuprot uobičajenoj podeli Fukoovog rada na tri faze, koje obeležavaju različita polja razmatranja – diskurs, moć, subjekat – u ovom radu se zastupa kontinuitet njegove misli. Ideja da nema naglih preokreta koji opravdavaju oštre podele, već radije promene težišta istraživanja, da su svi ključni pojmovi, manje ili više (ne)skriveni, prisutni u svim razdobljima Fukooveg misljenja i u svim, nesumnjivo različito orijentisanim i intoniranim spisima, ilustruje se razmatranjem karakteristika arheologije i genealogije, te njihovog odnosa, kao i odnosa diskurzivnih praksi i strategija moći prema znanju. Ta retrospektiva i (re)interpretacija Fukoove misli valjalo bi da ukaze na neprestanu saigru pojmova koja svedoče o njenom kontinuitetu. Takvo stanovište, koje se zasniva na integritetu Fukoovog dela, može da ponudi i bolju osnovu za razumevanje njegovih posebnih aspekata.

Ključne reči: subjekat, znanje, arheologija, genealogija, problematizovanje, kontinuitet

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